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Introduction  
 
 
     Few philosophical tasks can be accounted more important than the attempt to clarify 
the meaning of the word 'good.' Indeed, without such clarification it is impossible to 
distinguish the important from the unimportant, as all claims to importance must appeal 
to some criteria of value, and all criteria of value must appeal to some notion of good. To 
gain insight into the meaning of this word, then, is a precondition to the ability to make 
any value-claim whatsoever.  
     Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics with the statement: “The good has been well-
defined as that at which all things aim.” This statement suggests that one might pursue the 
good simply by pursuing one's aims and desires. Such might suffice as a definition were it 
not that demands of interpersonal morality often require the sacrifice or deferral of one's 
own desires for the sake of others. Such considerations suggest that the meaning of good 
must be divorced from reference to strictly personal aims and desires. But from the 
moment we effect this divorce we begin swimming in ethical vapor. Perhaps the good, 
then, is what God desires, or what is 'orderly,' or what is 'rational,' or what is best for the 
society at large, etc. Or perhaps, given that all these answers have an air of arbitrariness 
about them, we must accept that the very word ‘good’ has merely conventional or 
functional meaning, and any search for its 'true' meaning is misguided. 
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     All this confusion, I believe, stems from what I will call the ethical paradox; i.e., the 
paradox that ethical life, as conventionally understood, often demands the sacrifice, or 
compromise, of what seems one's own good for the sake of others. Apart from this 
paradox Aristotle's definition might be relatively unproblematic.  
     In the following I would like to do three things. First, I would like to defend a version 
of Aristotle's definition as providing true insight into the meaning of the term good. 
Second, I would like to show how interpersonal morality can indeed be derived from this 
understanding of the good. And finally, I would like to briefly consider the implications 
of this for ethical theory.         
 
I. Desire and the Good 
     The very idea of good involves the idea of an imperative, a should. To speak of a good 
that should not be realized is oxymoronic. This lends credence to Aristotle's definition of 
the good as “that at which all things aim.” In Aristotelian metaphysics, of course, all 
things are believed to have aims; that is, the universe is envisioned as fundamentally 
teleological. In our mechanistically minded age, the notion that things in general have 
natural aims is largely disputed. It is easy to see how this fact itself must engender a 
certain amount of ethical confusion. If we define good as “that at which all things aim,” 
then the transition from a teleological to a mechanistic conception of the universe cannot 
but lead to doubt as to the very meaning and relevance of the term good. Perhaps the very 
idea of good is simply a relic of an archaic metaphysic. 
     And yet such a suggestion is contradicted by common experience. All value 
distinctions must employ an implicit appeal to some notion of good; even if it is only 'the 
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good for me.' If one chooses to go right as opposed to left, eat this meal as opposed to 
that, advance one view as opposed to another, one expresses a preference, and preference 
itself implies some idea of good.  
     This strongly suggests that the idea of good is not tied to a particular metaphysical 
system, but has its basis, rather, in some more primitive human experience. And indeed, a 
bit of reflection suggests that Aristotle's metaphysically laden definition of good as “that 
at which all things aim” is but an extrapolation and generalization of a far more basic 
notion of good as 'that at which I aim'; i.e., that which satisfies my needs and desires.      
     A full genealogical treatment of the idea of good is beyond the scope of this paper. It 
might be helpful, however, to make a few preliminary observations. The claim that the 
word good has the primitive meaning of 'that which satisfies desire' gains prima facia 
support from the frequency with which we use it to mean just this. When I am hungry 
food is good. When I am thirsty drink is good, etc. Of course, this gives the idea of good a 
decidedly private and subjective signification. Whence, then, does it derive its objective 
sense? It is possible to see this as a function of the sociality of language itself.  From the 
moment ‘good’ becomes a word it transcends the private sphere and acquires the 
universal scope native to language as such, despite the indeterminacy of that to which it 
now points. We now find this universalized idea institutionalized in cultural and religious 
forms, and formalized in abstract metaphysical systems. As such, it becomes instrumental 
in providing a conceptual foundation for societal value-formation; i.e., ethics.  
     Indeterminate though it be, this metaphysicalized idea of good has practical value for 
any society as a solution to the ethical paradox. To the extent that private good is seen as 
subsisting under transcendent good, the transcendent good can be raised as an ethical 
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standard over and against the private, demanding sacrifice in its name. Sanctions, of one 
sort or another, can now be imposed or merely threatened, to correlate the interests of the 
private with the interests of the transcendent, rendering conformity to the transcendent 
personally compelling. 
     Of course, this situation is highly subject to abuse. The very indeterminacy of the 
'transcendent good' allows it to be invoked in support of any value-claim whatsoever. 
Hence one atrocity after another can be committed “in the name of God.” Nor is it 
possible to render reasoned criticism against such abuse, for the indeterminacy and 
transcendency of the good shield it from critical scrutiny. This, in turn, leads to a reaction 
against metaphysical thinking itself.  
     And precisely to the extent that the good has been rendered metaphysical, its 
signification is obscured with the breakdown of metaphysical thinking. Thus, we enter 
into a crisis of ethical definition. Nietzsche's famous 'Death of God' passage in The Gay 
Science remains among the most striking expressions of this crisis. Dostoevsky's famous 
line, “If God doesn't exist all is permissible” is a more concise statement of the same. 
Having grounded ethical principles in the transcendent for so long, skepticism concerning 
the transcendent yields ethical confusion. Where, now, is the ground of value to be 
located?   
     To answer this question, I believe, we must return to the primitive signification of 
good as the 'satisfaction of desire,' and carefully examine its implications.       
 
     The first thing I wish to do is replace the word 'desire' with a word less associated with   
sensual pursuits. Of course, human beings have sensual desires, but we have many others 
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as well. The mother's desire for the well-being of her child is as much a real desire as the 
glutton's desire for his next meal. In order to convey this broader concept of desire I will 
use the word caring. Insofar as there is a matter about which one cares, that matter may 
be said to have a good and a bad associated with it. The word caring recommends itself 
for two reasons. First, in common language, anything about which we say we care is 
something with respect to which we have some desire or other. Second, I use the term 
with a nod to Heidegger, who employs the term Care to designate the concernful dynamic 
of human temporality, which he regards as basic to human existence itself, and which I 
find expressive of the value-laden character of human life.          
     It is with respect to the phenomenon of caring, then, that we find, primitively, 
something like a good and a bad, and good and bad may each be defined, respectively, as 
that toward which caring tends and that from which caring avers. It is apparent that this 
definition makes the good relative to a given instance of caring. But such relativism must 
be seen as radically distinct from the conventionalism often associated with it. Although 
the good is good only relative to some instance of caring, caring itself, at least at its most 
primitive, is not rooted in social convention. Even the smallest infant shows signs of 
desire, i.e., caring, prior to and independent of any societal influence. Caring is an 
ontological fact, not a conventional artifact. It is my view that the ontological reality of 
caring lies at the basis of the very concept of value.    
     Of course, we do not find free-floating instances of caring seeking their individual 
satisfaction disconnected from all else. Rather we find caring beings in which individual 
desires and impulses are related to one another in complex ways. And although requisites 
of exposition have made it necessary for us to focus, first, upon the individual instance of 
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caring or desire in order to reveal the meaning of the word good at its most primitive, we 
must now raise our sights to recognize that it is the satisfaction of the caring being as a 
whole to which the words good and bad must ultimately refer. Let us designate this 
overall state of satisfaction 'well-being' and define a 'caring being' as a being with an 
impetus to well-being. For any caring being its well-being is its good and its ill-being is 
its bad. We can further say that it is only with respect to caring beings, i.e., beings with an 
impetus to well-being, that the terms good and bad have relevance. Rocks, insofar as they 
are not caring beings, do not have a good or a bad relative to them.  
     It is important to get clear about the uniqueness of caring’s relativity vis-à-vis other 
things we speak of as having relative value. Generally, when we say that something has 
relative value we mean that its value is relative to something other than itself. For 
instance, paper money is only valuable relative to a given society's willingness to honor it. 
Should this change, the value of the paper changes as well. The paper money, thus, has no 
intrinsic value.  
     But the situation is quite different with caring. Although a caring being's value is 
relative in a sense, it is relative to itself. A caring being is a value to itself. Thus, we 
cannot alter caring's value by altering something else in the world. Even if the entire 
universe were emptied of all but one caring being – still the value of that caring being 
would remain. For its value is to itself and hence in itself. Thus, we may speak of caring 
as having intrinsic value and even, in a sense, absolute value. Such value, we might say, 
to use the language of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, is “inalienable.” A caring 
being cannot be deprived of its value, for its value is inherent to the kind of being it is. 
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     It can be shown, further, that all valuing must arise from the self-valuing of caring 
beings. At the start of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the need for a telos of 
value to which any value-claim must ultimately be referred. For instance, a cup is 
valuable only because it serves to contain drink. Drink is valuable only because it serves 
to quench thirst, etc. But ultimately, any value claim must be referred to something that is 
valuable in itself, without reference to something else, otherwise the chain of reference 
would continue indefinitely with nothing ever cited from which value is originally 
conferred.    
     But what sort of thing could be valuable in itself? Kant famously cites 'rational nature' 
as an 'end in itself,' but it does not seem to me Kant ever states clearly what makes 
something an ‘end in itself.’ It is possible, however, to answer this question with clarity. 
Only that which is valuable to itself can be valuable in itself. This is clear from the 
following considerations: For anything to have value it must have value to someone who 
values it. A world devoid of anyone who values would also be a world devoid of anything 
of value. If we say that X is of value, then, it must be that X is valuable either to itself or 
to something else. Anything of value only to something else is obviously not of value in 
itself; it is merely a means to another end. Only that which is valuable to itself then, that 
which holds itself as valuable, can be valuable in itself. Hence, only that which is 
valuable to itself can be an 'end in itself,' a telos of value.  
     And this is just what we mean by caring. I have defined a caring being as a 'being with 
an impetus to well-being,' but this definition is just an attempt to express, in an accessible 
manner, the essential feature of self-valuing pertaining to every caring being. Every 
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caring being is a ground of value insofar as it values itself. To put it another way: To 
value oneself is the necessary and sufficient condition for being of intrinsic value.  
     Further, only caring can be a ground of value. Not only does caring ground value, but 
it should be clear that nothing else can ground value. Anything that does not value itself 
can only be valuable by reference to something else that does, and hence cannot itself be a 
ground of value. Thus, the phenomenon of caring must be seen as the ground of all value, 
and the well-being of caring beings as that toward which all authentic valuing must tend.  
 
     It is the work of the virtue ethicist to examine the nature of, and the way to, human 
well-being. It is often supposed by virtue ethicists that once virtue is achieved 
interpersonal morality will follow as a natural consequence. The most celebrated 
expression of this is the Socratic dictum that 'to know the good is to do the good.' The 
idea here is that a certain regard for others is necessary for the well-being of the moral 
agent, and, since all caring beings seek well-being, the truly enlightened agent will 
always, therefore, behave morally. This may or may not be true, but I contend that 
regardless of its truth, it does not provide the proper rationale for interpersonal morality. 
The rationale for interpersonal morality cannot be predicated upon the self-interest of the 
agent. A simple example will suffice to show this. 
     There is a moral dilemma I was introduced to as a child that will serve us nicely here: 
Imagine that a device has been rigged up through which you can deliver a disabling injury 
to some being on Alpha-Centauri by pushing a button. Suppose, also, that if you push this 
button you will be given a significant sum of money. Suppose, further, that the universe is 
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so configured that nothing you do to this other being will ever impact upon you, either 
physically or 'spiritually.' Is it wrong to push the button? 
     The whole purpose of this example, of course, is to exclude from consideration any 
appeal to the self-interest of the agent. Common morality tells us that it is still wrong to 
push the button, but the virtue ethicist, restricted to the appeal to enlightened self-interest, 
cannot tell us why. Indeed, here we confront the ethical paradox we noted above: If we 
are right in locating the seat of value in the impetus to well-being, then in the name of 
what value can it be maintained that one should put aside any part of one's own well-
being for the sake of others? Whence comes the imperative for interpersonal morality?  
 
II. The Ethical Paradox 
     I want to be quick to clarify the above question. I do not now ask it in the genealogical 
but in the normative sense. We are not interested in how, developmentally or historically, 
the human being comes to acquire an interpersonal morality, but in identifying the value 
that underwrites the imperative to interpersonal morality.  
     At this point it would be appropriate to review some of the classic answers to this 
question in the history of philosophy. Limitations of space, of course, make it impossible 
for me to do so fully or even adequately, but it will be helpful to make a few comments 
nonetheless.  
 
     Kantian rationalism tackles the problem head-on in its insistence that interpersonal 
morality be divorced from any appeal to the agent's will to happiness, and be, rather, 
grounded in the agent's rational will. The problems with Kantian rationalism, in my view, 
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are twofold. First, rational consistency, taken in itself, is an arbitrary standard of value. 
Why should rational consistency be regarded as a more appropriate standard for behavior 
than, say, impulsive spontaneity? Second, to the extent that Kant attempts to ground the 
value of rational consistency in the value of the unity of the self, or the autonomy of the 
will, he ultimately reduces that value to the well-being of the person whose autonomy or 
unity is at stake. Thus, in spite of Kant's attempt to divorce his morality from the value of 
the agent's well-being, he ultimately appeals to it. 
     The Humean strategy of identifying a benevolent impulse in human nature as the 
ground of interpersonal morality famously commits the naturalist fallacy. To the extent 
that morality is predicated upon sentiments of the agent, when those sentiments are 
lacking so is the imperative for moral rectitude. Further, the appeal to benevolent 
sentiment is, ultimately, an appeal to the well-being of the agent, whose benevolent 
sentiments are, presumably, satisfied/expressed through moral action.  
     Utilitarianism makes a leap from the happiness of the individual to the happiness of 
the 'greatest number,' but the justification for this leap is never clearly articulated. It is 
clear why the happiness of the individual is of value to the individual, but it is unclear 
why the individual should concern herself with the 'greatest number.' Any attempt to 
justify this principle on the grounds that the individual has a stake in the good of society 
at large, is ultimately an appeal to the individual's self-interest. 
     Traditional Judeo-Christian deontology ('Divine command theory'), in which the 
imperative to interpersonal morality is derived from the dictates of God, commits what 
may be called the 'Euthyphro fallacy.’ Put simply, it begs the question as to what is good 
about God's dictates.  What grants them their authority or legitimacy?   
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     Ironically, the ethicist who, in my view, comes closest to identifying the true locus of 
value for interpersonal morality is one who never intended to do any such thing: Friedrich 
Nietzsche. It is only Nietzsche, as far as I know, who locates the demand to respect the 
value of the other in the impetus to well-being of the other. In his Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche posits that interpersonal morality arises from the self-affirmation (the ‘will to 
power’) of the weak, who develop moral principles for the sake of inducing the strong to 
treat them with respect. The promulgation of these principles, says Nietzsche, gives the 
weak some leverage over the strong. The question, of course, is how can an imperative 
issuing from the nature of the moral patient (in this case, the weak) translate into an 
imperative for the moral agent. Nietzsche famously answers that it cannot, and this 
answer is the basis of his 'immoralism.' I wish to advance a different answer. 
     But before doing so let us consider more carefully the legitimacy of the moral patient's 
demand to be treated with respect. The moral patient, we say, insofar as he or she is a 
caring being, makes an inherent demand to be treated with respect. Or to express this 
more precisely, the impetus to well-being that constitutes the patient's caring entails such 
a demand. The demand is inherent in the nature of caring itself. Caring is already a 
demand for respect of that about which it cares. In other words, the impetus to well-being 
entails the demand that well-being be advanced and not thwarted; to say this is simply to 
expand upon what we mean by the term 'impetus.'  
     In order to evaluate whether or not such a demand is legitimate, i.e., deserving of 
respect, we would seem to need some criterion of legitimacy other than the impetus to 
well-being itself, by which to judge it. But here we encounter a problem. Any criterion of 
legitimacy must appeal to some value-claim. But, as we have already noted, any value-
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claim must be grounded in the caring of some caring being. Hence, there can be no 
criterion of legitimacy, other than caring itself, by which caring's legitimacy can be 
judged, for caring is the basis of all value criteria. A simple thought experiment can make 
this even clearer:  Imagine a universe in which there are no caring beings; i.e., no beings 
with an impetus to well-being. On what basis could we now say of anything in this 
universe that it is 'better' or 'worse' than anything else? Better or worse for whom? 
Without the good of some caring being to appeal to, it is impossible to distinguish one 
state of affairs from another with regard to value. This, again, indicates that the very 
notion of value is grounded in, and inseparable from, the reality of caring. 
     This being the case, how are we to evaluate caring itself? In other words, what 
criterion of value can we use with which to determine the value of a caring being? Insofar 
as caring is itself the source of all valuing, it cannot be evaluated by anything other than 
itself. So, we must interrogate caring with respect to itself about its own value. And we 
find, when we do, that it is of the very nature of caring to insist upon itself; to, so to 
speak, assert its own value. Hence caring's value is absolute with respect to itself. This is 
what we mean when we say that a caring being is of intrinsic value. Its value is inherent 
in its own self-valuing. It is the ground of its own value.    
     But why should one caring being respect the intrinsic value of another? Or, to express 
this question in the terms we used above, how does the imperative for respect issuing 
from the caring of the moral patient translate into an imperative for the moral agent? 
     The answer to this question is simpler than it may seem. As we have said, caring has 
value in itself. Thus, it is a violation of something of value to violate caring. This 
violation has the status of a fact, invariable with respect to opinion. In other words, in 
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noting caring's intrinsic value we have already said why it is bad to violate it, to the 
extent that we mean by bad the destruction of what has value. We now turn to the 
question of why it is wrong to violate it; i.e., why another caring being should avoid 
engendering such bad. 
     But in saying it is bad we have, in effect, already said why it is wrong; to the extent 
that we concede that it is wrong to intentionally and avoidably engender bad. 
     But what compels us to concede this?   
     To make this clear, we must ask the moral agent to reflect upon herself. Given that all 
value is grounded in the self-valuing of caring, there is no basis upon which one caring 
being could claim priority over another with respect to value; since there is no 
independent criterion of value by which the one could be assessed above the other. Each 
is a value to itself. The moral agent must recognize, then, that her demand to be treated 
with respect and the patient's demand to be treated with respect have precisely the same 
status. Recognizing this, she cannot deny the legitimacy of the patient's demand without, 
in principle, denying the legitimacy of her own. But she cannot deny the legitimacy of her 
own demand without implicitly acknowledging the right of anyone and everyone to abuse 
her in any way they like. And to allow such a thing would be in contravention of her very 
nature as a caring being; i.e., as a being with an impetus to well-being. Her very being 
demands respect whether she likes it or not. Given this, she is impelled by her own 
nature's demand for respect to acknowledge the legitimacy of all other caring beings’ 
demands for respect as well – since they rest upon the same basis.  
     In other words, one discovers in one's own demand to be treated with respect the 
universal demand of any caring being to be treated with respect. One cannot deny the 
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latter without denying the former. And one cannot deny the former without standing in 
opposition to oneself. Thus, one is impelled, by one's own nature, to acknowledge the 
universal right of all caring beings to be treated with respect. 
     Or, to express it in yet other words: in affirming that one's own caring deserves 
respect, an affirmation one is driven to by the very nature of one's caring, one implicitly 
affirms that caring as such deserves respect, and thus, that the caring of others deserves 
respect as well. One could only escape the logic of this by claiming that there is 
something about one's own caring that makes it more valuable than the caring of others. 
But given that all value-claims must themselves be grounded in caring, no such claim can 
ever be justified. 
     It is important to point out that the logic articulated above merely serves to point out 
an ontological truth that one might see, and many do see, without the aid of such logic. 
The truth is simply this: that caring beings are intrinsically deserving of respect by reason 
of their very caring.  
     This, then, leads directly to the principle of universal regard expressed in the Golden 
Rule and its variants: that one must recognize in the other the same intrinsic value one 
finds in oneself. This principle, thus, long associated with the transcendent value-claims 
of Judeo-Christian deontology, may be grounded just as surely, indeed more surely, in the 
immanence of value apparent to considered reflection. 
     With this we answer all moral relativisms and nihilisms. Given the intrinsic value of 
caring beings all is not permissible, whether God exists or not. 1 
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III. Implications and Conclusion 
     What I have attempted to do above is provide what I would consider the necessary 
core for any ethical theory. I do not see it as replacing other classical theories so much as 
supplying their proper ground. Indeed, when this ground is clearly seen, the mutual 
compatibility of many theories that seemed incompatible becomes clear as well. 
     Kantian rationalism retains its significance both as an articulation of the principle of 
universalization without which interpersonal morality would be impossible, and as a 
strong statement concerning the dignity, i.e., intrinsic value, of the human being. I do not, 
for the most part, argue with Kant's results, but with how he arrives at them. Kant 
correctly intuits that the moral imperative cannot be predicated upon the self-interest of 
the moral agent, but then incorrectly infers from this that, therefore, it cannot be 
predicated upon anyone's self-interest. But, in fact, it is predicated on the self-interest of 
the moral patient. In casting about for something to base the moral imperative on, Kant 
lights upon the 'rational will,' having noticed, apparently, that reason is required for 
universalized thinking, and free will for moral responsibility, and that, therefore, a 
rational, autonomous, will is necessary for the application of moral principles. In this, 
again, I concur. Insofar as animals do not reason, and cannot universalize, they cannot be 
full-fledged moral agents. But Kant is wrong in supposing reason to be morality's basis 
rather than merely its instrument. Thus, he supposes that only rational beings are moral 
patients. But insofar as animals are still caring beings they count as moral patients as 
well, regardless of their having or not having a rational nature.2 It is not reason that 
makes a being an 'end in itself,' but caring; i.e., the impetus to well-being. 
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     Humean sentimentalism, and virtue ethics in general, still have an important role to 
play in directing us toward the human good. I believe it is true that human beings have 
natural benevolent sentiments that ought to be cultivated, both for their own sakes and the 
sake of others. But such sentiments do not ground the demands of interpersonal morality, 
they merely suggest that human nature, or some part of it, is in natural accord with these 
demands. 
     The utilitarian dictate to seek 'the greatest good for the greatest number' provides a 
valuable rule of thumb for adjudicating interpersonal conflicts. But this rule of thumb, 
again, is not the basis of morality, it is merely a means for protecting, as well as possible 
in a complex world, what truly lies at the basis: the intrinsic value of individual caring 
beings.    
     Finally, theism is by no means rendered ethically irrelevant by this theory. The 
possibility remains that the universe is so configured that the good of one person must be 
had at the expense of the good of others; a circumstance that would make interpersonal 
morality untenable.  Such would be an essentially tragic universe in which we would have 
to deaden our moral impulses in order to pursue our own well-being. Nietzsche's 
metaphysic of power often seems to suggest just this, thereby justifying his immoralism. 
Theism posits that the reverse is the case; that reality is ultimately a coordinated whole 
with respect to value, such that the ultimate well-being of one person requires his/her 
concern and respect for the ultimate well-being of others. This is somewhat crudely 
expressed in theistic allusions to reward and punishment (heaven and hell), but more 
subtly expressed in the notion that compassion and love, and the interpersonal 
relationships made possible by them, are central to human well-being itself. 
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     But compassion is truly realized only when the compassionate person is focused on 
the good of the other, rather than on the rewards that may be granted the compassionate. 
And so, this theory provides an important corrective to theistic deontology, which often 
seems to conflate the value of compassion with the value of its reward, or, more 
troublesome still, with the purported value of blind obedience to divine dictate. 
 
     In sum, this paper is meant to express a very basic and simple truth: that it is wrong to 
hurt others, and that the reason it’s wrong to hurt them, is because it hurts them. For 
some reason not entirely clear to me, this simple but very important truth has not been   
articulated very well in the history of philosophical ethics. My hope is that this paper will, 
in some small measure, help to correct this.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 It is possible, admittedly, to willfully deny one's own demand for respect and thereby, 
ostensibly, deny one's responsibility to respect others. In so doing, I would say, one 
defines oneself 'outside of the circle of moral concern.' There are many things in nature 
outside of the circle of moral concern – such as tornados and viruses – which are a 
potential menace but make no moral claim for themselves. One would now have classed 
oneself among these. The prudent response of society to such things is to destroy them.  
To the extent that we destroy what is harmful to caring beings and makes no moral claim 
for itself, we benefit those who do make a moral claim and harm nothing of moral 
significance. If we took the moral nihilist at her word, then, we would have full sanction 
to destroy her. The moment she protested she would, in effect, be demanding that she not 
be taken at her word. 
     Of course, I am not advocating that we destroy moral nihilists. My point is that, when 
push comes to shove, no one can sincerely deny his or her demand for respect, for it is 
inherent to caring itself. From this fact, moral responsibility follows, whether one is 
willing to acknowledge it or not.  
 
2 Does this mean that animals are to be regarded as having the same worth as human 
beings? What about insects (who also manifest caring to some degree)? These questions 
lead us into some difficult metaphysical and ethical territory. The general rule is: every 
caring being must be respected in its caring. Where there is no well-formed self, however, 
there is no self demanding respect. Of course, in the higher animals we may conclude that 
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there is indeed a self demanding respect, and then we would be morally obliged to show 
it. As for the lower animals, we do not owe their caring the same kind of regard we owe 
to human caring because they do not have the same quality of caring as human beings.  
Still, they can experience pain and suffering, and we certainly have a moral responsibility 
not to unduly cause it.   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Further Reflections 
 
(The notes below are not tied to specific places in the text, but are expansions of themes 
touched on throughout the body of the essay.)  
 
1. Caring's ‘Absolute’ Value 
     As we have said, the 'relativity' of caring's value does not render it variable according 
to the view of the observer, insofar as caring's value is relative to itself. For this reason, 
the fact that some moral agent may not be willing to honor the value of some moral 
patient cannot in any way detract from that moral patient's true value. Indeed, even if 
everyone in the universe were to refuse to honor the value of some one caring being, this 
would not alter the fact that this being has value. True, its value is 'relative' in a sense, but 
relative to itself, and, hence, also, in a sense, absolute.   
     Thus, it is an absolute 'bad' to harm a caring being, insofar as we mean by 'bad' the 
destruction of what has value. This badness is a fact. It is not variable according to 
opinion. Recognition of this allows us to bridge the so-called 'fact-value' divide. 
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2. The Meaning of 'Right' and ‘Wrong' 
     It may be objected that in defining 'wrong' as 'the intentional and avoidable doing of 
what results in bad,’ I have confused the meaning of 'wrong' with a proposed content. 
'Wrong' has the meaning of 'that which should not be done.' But this meaning of 'wrong' 
does not denote any particular content; it does not say what should not be done. In 
stipulating that doing 'bad' is 'wrong,' have I not merely asserted what I need to 
demonstrate? Suppose someone should concede the badness of bad, in the sense defined 
in the essay, but deny the wrongness of doing (or engendering) bad? 
     What would such a person be denying? They would be denying the universal 
applicability of the imperative to avoid bad. In other words, although caring entails the 
imperative that its own bad be avoided, this imperative does not, in itself, refer to others. 
Might not someone argue that the imperative to avoid bad that arises from caring is 
relevant only to the one whose caring it is, and does not make reference to anyone else?  
     My answer is as follows: The imperative to avoid bad is not, strictly, relative to the 
person whose bad it is, but to the phenomenon of caring as such. Wherever there is caring 
there is the imperative to avoid harming that caring. This imperative, further, though 
issued from the moral patient, does not address itself only to the moral patient, but to the 
world at large. The moral patient wishes to avoid harm from wherever it may come. The 
moral agent, then, is addressed by this demand and must respond to it. The question the 
moral agent must consider is whether or not the value underlying the patient's demand for 
respect is a worthy one. But this value is the value of caring itself; i.e., of self-valuing. 
The moral agent, in demanding respect for herself, already acknowledges this value to be 
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a worthy one, and cannot deny its worth without standing in opposition to her own self-
valuing. Thus, the moral agent must concede the worthiness of the patient's demand for 
respect, and grant that it is 'wrong' to do 'bad.'   
     But suppose a Raskolnikov, or a Nietzsche, or a Hitler should assert that, because of 
some special status that they have vis-à-vis others, they can affirm their own self-valuing 
while denying that of others, avoiding inconsistency by appeal to their 'special status.'  At 
this point we must ask them to articulate the basis of their claim to special status. 
Whatever they answer must entail some value claim. But all value claims arise from 
caring, and must appeal to caring for their legitimacy. Hence, no value claim can override 
the basic claim that caring itself be respected – for if it did it would override its own basis 
and thereby undermine itself.  
     Thus, Raskolnikov may have 'special status’ vis-à-vis his intelligence or vis-à-vis his 
artistic talent or vis-à-vis his athletic skill, but he cannot have special status vis-à-vis his 
fundamental right to be respected in his caring, for this right is a function of caring's 
intrinsic self-valuing and, as such, is universal to all caring beings.   
     This leads to the egalitarian principles long associated with politico-ethical liberalism. 
It is just in this sense that “all men are created equal.”  
     This has interesting implications with respect to the question of God's value (see notes 
3 and 5 below).      
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3. God as Bestower of Value 
     Have I not deprived God of God’s divine function as bestower of value? In deriving 
the value of caring beings from themselves rather than from God, have I not displaced 
God as the font of value? 
     I have not, because I do not derive the value of caring beings from their will but from 
their being. And finite beings are not the source of their own being. Thus, they are not the 
source of their own (albeit, intrinsic) value. In other words, caring beings are of intrinsic 
value whether they like it or not – their value is not self-created but is a function of their 
being. Thus, like their being, their value is ontologically grounded in something beyond 
themselves. In this sense, their will owes a responsibility to their being. They are obliged 
to treat themselves with respect.  
     Still, this intrinsic value, once created, is 'inalienable.' It cannot be removed without 
annihilation of the being whose value it is. It cannot be changed by decree, not even 
God's. Thus, as Judaism has long affirmed, even God, to the extent that God is envisioned 
as a moral agent, has a moral responsibility to respect the intrinsic value of caring beings.  
     With this we can answer the claim of Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov that 'If God 
doesn't exist all things are permissible.' This claim is based upon what may be called 
'theistic deontology'; i.e., the doctrine that value derives from God's commands. Our 
analysis shows that this is not true. God's commands reveal value but do not create it. 
Finite value derives from God's creative act of engendering the finite world. Infinite value 
is of God's being itself. God’s will (so we suppose) is in accord with the infinite goodness 
of God’s being, which is what gives God’s will moral authority. But these are 
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metaphysical statements that are not essential to the affirmation of value. One can 
discover value in creaturely being whether or not one discovers God there. Given the 
intrinsic value of caring beings, all is not permissible, whether God exists or not.  
 
4. The Incarnation and the Principle of Immanence 
     Both Jesus and Hillel cite the Golden Rule as 'summing up' the essential teachings of 
Jewish scripture, so often taken as promoting a transcendent, authoritarian ethic. Jesus' 
claim to 'fulfill' and not 'destroy' the law is relevant here. The doctrine of immanence does 
not abolish but consummates the doctrine of transcendence. Value, originating in God, is, 
nevertheless, not monopolized by God. Through creation God's value is disseminated to 
all creatures.  
     Indeed, we may see in this the true significance of the 'incarnational' doctrine of 
Christianity. Transcendent value is rendered immanent through creation: God’s value is 
‘incarnated’ in human beings. When this is fully recognized, this principle of immanent 
value becomes a touchstone with which we can evaluate all transcendent value-claims. In 
this manner we secure ourselves from the danger of value-claims accorded a false sanctity 
through appeal to an indeterminate transcendency. We thus reclaim the meaning of 'good' 
from indeterminacy and can establish criteria with which to evaluate claims to 'goodness'; 
criteria which may not neglect the good of the 'least of these'; i.e., of any caring being.  
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5. God's Supreme Value  
     If all caring beings are equally valuable, what does this do to the notion that God's 
value is 'supreme'? Does our theory not undercut the idea of God's supremacy? It does 
not, but it does force us to understand this supremacy in a deeper way. 
     To the extent that God is envisioned as just one ego among others, any claim to 
supremacy on God’s part would be despotic. Many who object to theism object to it for 
this very reason, and validly so. There can be no 'supreme' ego. But there remains a 
profound sense in which God's value can indeed be supreme. God is supreme insofar as 
God is the supreme telos, not only of God, but of all else as well. God is supreme insofar 
as communion with God constitutes our consummate well-being. God’s supremacy is 
justified not by reference to God’s own self-valuing but by reference to ours. God is 
supreme for us. 
     But doesn't this subordinate God's value to our own? Doesn't it give God the status of 
a 'servant'? At this point we might remind ourselves of Jesus' statement, "If anyone wants 
to be first, he must be the very last, and servant of all" (Mk. 9:34). Supremacy of value 
derives from service not from 'special ego status.' The same idea is expressed definitively 
in John1 4:8: "God is love" and in the gloss on this in John1 4:10: "This is love: not that 
we loved God but that he loved us..." 
     A major theme of the New Testament is that the honor customarily proffered the 
mighty, out of fear and envy, is more appropriately rendered to those who serve, out of 
gratitude and respect. Thus, God's Kingship is 'not of this world,' for it is a Kingship of 
service, not of being served. The image of Jesus on the Cross – of the God who suffers 
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for our sake – is Christianity's most striking expression of this: "For God so loved the 
world that he gave his only begotten son..." (Jn. 3:16).  
     To balk at the indignity of this is to respond as Peter did when Jesus stooped to wash 
his disciples' feet. " 'No,' said Peter, 'you shall never wash my feet.' Jesus answered, 
'Unless I wash you, you have no part with me' " (Jn.  13:8). The lesson? "You call me 
Teacher and Lord and rightly so, for that is what I am. Now that I, your Teacher and Lord, 
have washed your feet you also should wash one another's feet. I have set you an example 
that you should do as I have done for you" (Jn. 13-15). In other words, the greatest is the 
servant of all. Peter's failure to see the rightness of this is a barrier to his own beatitude.  
     This, of course, is not to say that God is not to be revered. But God is to be revered for 
God’s goodness. God's supremacy of value is not a function of might but of love. Indeed, 
God’s might acquires value only through God’s love. And we become godlike not by 
imitating this might but this love.  
     That this message has been obscured by the despotic and masochistic tendencies of 
many who have delivered it cannot be doubted, and this obfuscation infects even the 
gospels themselves. But that this is the authentic message of Jesus is beyond doubt. Its 
authenticity is assured by its being in no one's exclusive, but everyone's inclusive, 
interest.  In this way, it is a message reflecting the intrinsic value of caring itself,.  
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6. Between Christ and Ubermensch 
     A moment's reflection on the Golden Rule makes it clear that a completely selfless 
being could never apply it. If we love our neighbors as ourselves but have no love for 
ourselves our neighbors aren't going to fare too well either. One cannot program the 
Golden Rule into a computer and expect a moral outcome. Only a self-caring being can 
be an other-caring being.  
     It is because of this that the model of Christ as a completely self-sacrificing being can 
become yet another excuse for human despotism and masochism. The demand to follow 
Christ in total self-denial can lead to cruelty toward self and other. The Nietzschean 
critique of Christianity rests in this. But true love is a circle. It flows to the other and 
back. Christianity at its most profound and beautiful expresses this idea through the circle 
of the Trinity. God is a dynamic circle of love. Through participation in this circle 
everyone is filled, not emptied.  
     The oppressive demand for total self-sacrifice meets its response in the stultifying 
insistence on total self-regard: Nietzsche's Ubermensch. The loneliness of total self-
regard is as pathetic as the pointlessness of total self-denial. Zarathustra's loneliness is 
among the most striking aspects of Nietzsche's mock-prophetic work. Zarathustra's need 
for others and contempt for others never gets resolved. 
     Again, we are stunned by the wisdom of the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule does not 
ask us to deny our own value but to recognize the reflection of our own value in the other. 
Where total self-regard neglects the value of the other and total self-sacrifice neglects the 
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value of the self, the Golden Rule affirms the value of all. It is the value-affirming rule. 
The Golden Rule, understood properly, decrees: Work for universal happiness.  
 
7. The Meaning of the Word 'Good' and the 'Fact-Value' Divide 
     At its barest, the word good may be defined as 'an expression of approval.' As such it 
seems to be independent of any particular content. Approval can be produced 
(presumably) through a mere act of will, and can ostensibly be associated with any state 
of affairs whatsoever; i.e., anything at all can be called good. This is what leads to the 
notion that there is a fact-value divide. Facts have ontological status but values are 
somehow quasi-real and subject to the will; they have no firm ontological standing. This 
is the argument of the relativists and nihilists who believe that the word good has no 
native content. Anything might be called good, hence nothing is good as such. 
     But reflection proves this view false. The word good, at very least, entails the idea of 
approval. Further, the very possibility of approval implies the existence of valuing beings. 
To approve of something is to make a value judgment with respect to it. And a value 
judgment can only be made in a world in which there is some such phenomenon as 
valuing. Further, valuing is only possible for a caring being, i.e., a being who values 
itself, since, as we have shown, all value must be grounded in self-value. The very 
existence of the word good, then, implies the existence of self-valuing, i.e. caring, beings. 
     And the existence of caring beings entails the imputus to well-being, which leads to 
the demand for respect from others, which leads to the Golden Rule, which is itself the 
basis of all further moral principles.  
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     Thus, the very existence of the word good entails the whole of morality. There is no 
fact-value divide. 
     Why, then, is it possible to call anything at all good?  For the same reason it is 
possible to call something white blue or to call something true false; i.e., it is possible to 
be in error.   
     We can approach this same question in another way. The word good appears to have 
two aspects to it. On the one hand, good refers to 'that which conduces to well-being.' On 
the other, good is 'that which is approved of.' Clearly there is a primitive relation between 
these two meanings. Everyone naturally approves of that which is conducive to their own 
well-being. Conceptually, however, it is possible to distinguish these two aspects of the 
meaning of good and divorce them from one another. Indeed, the 'ethical paradox' seems 
to require this divorce; for ethical treatment of others demands that we recognize as good 
(and hence approve of) things that are not necessarily conducive to our own well-being. 
And once this divorce is made (as I've indicated in the body of the essay) it is subject to 
abuse. Anything can now be called good, i.e., recommended for approval, regardless of its 
actual benefit to anyone. This is what allows an Ockham, for instance, to declare God's 
will good by definition; i.e., to be approved of regardless of whether it serves any 
desirable end. Thomism, rightly, rejects such a notion: For Aquinas, God is good, indeed 
the seat of goodness, because God is the desirable end itself. In God the two meanings of 
good are once again fully reconciled.  
     Ockham’s view is a recipe for despotic authoritarianism. Having divorced the idea of 
good from well-being, authoritarianism can decree anything as good and, hence, to be 
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approved of and done, with no justification whatsoever. Again and again such despotic 
claims lead to anarchic reactions and then to despotic reactions to these. The problem 
arises from the artificial divorce effected between that part of the idea of good pertaining 
to approval and that part pertaining to well-being.       
 
8. The heart of the matter 
     The very nature of language forces us to express the moral relation in highly abstract 
terms which cloud its true significance and can give it the sense of something purely 
formal. Nothing could be further from the truth, however.  What is called for by the 
Golden Rule is an openness to the other which, when present, provides its own sufficient 
‘moral argument.' Martin Buber's I and Thou is perhaps the best expression of this. 
Nevertheless, such openness has an underlying rationale that is articulable – it is not mere 
arbitrary sentiment. True moral consciousness lives in openness to the intrinsic value of 
self and other, and recognizes the demand to respect this intrinsic value to be self-
validating; i.e., in no need of further justification. One need not be a logician to see moral 
truth, and many a logician will miss it – as the history of philosophical ethics shows. 
Indeed, logic alone could never see this truth, as it is revealed only in one's sensitivity to 
one's own self-valuing and the self-valuing of others.  
 
9. Between Nihilism and Authoritarianism 
     Moral nihilism and moral authoritarianism are two sides of the same coin; indeed each 
is a reaction to the threat of the other, and both are responses to the general inability to 
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articulate the seat of value. Nihilism opposes authoritarianism in defense of a freedom 
whose value it is afraid to affirm for fear such affirmation will be used to undermine 
freedom. Authoritarianism opposes nihilism in fear of moral chaos, but in the name of an 
absolute it is not able to justify. Nihilism is afraid of the despotism of authority. 
Authoritarianism is afraid of the chaos of nihilism.  
     The truth shall set them free. To the nihilists we say: No, there is, in fact, an absolute 
seat of value. To the authoritarians we say: No, this absolute seat of value does not stand 
over and above everyone, but is immanent in every person.  
     What is left, of course, is the task of adjudicating interpersonal conflict. This must be 
done according to principles of fairness, as developed by ethicists such as Rawls, Hare, 
Habermas, etc. Again, our theory in no way replaces the ideas developed by such 
ethicists, it merely identifies their ground.  
 
10. The Moral 'Ought' 
     Whence derives the moral 'ought'? The 'ought', of course, is a demand, and every 
demand speaks with a certain force. The force behind the moral 'ought' is the truth of 
value. It is almost impossible to understand this without overcoming the modern notion 
of an essential fact/value divide. Hume is famous for saying that you cannot get an 'ought' 
from an 'is,' but he really should have said that you cannot get an 'ought' from an 'is' that 
doesn't have an 'ought' already inherent within it. The fact that the human world is, and 
has always been, full of 'oughts' testifies to the flaw in Hume's thinking: if you cannot get 
an 'ought' from an 'is' then where have all these 'oughts' come from?  
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     That one 'ought' not to offend against that which has intrinsic value is a fact we all 
know from the reaction of our own nature to offense; that is, our own caring nature makes 
a demand to the world that it not be violated, and responds with pain when it is. This 
demand for respect is a fact inherent to caring itself. That one 'ought' not to offend against 
the intrinsic value of another is the simplest extrapolation from this. We can put it in the 
form of a syllogism:  
Major Premise: My caring is such that it ought not to be violated. 
Minor Premise: The caring of others is of the same sort as mine. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the caring of others ought not to be violated. 
     We know the major premise to be true through self-reflection. We know the minor 
premise to be true to the extent that we are not solipsists. Hence, we know the conclusion 
to be true.  
     This, of course, says nothing as to what will motivate us to respect the other. But it is 
possible to be motivated by a recognition of the sheer rightness of something. In this, we 
find ourselves converging upon Kant. And yet, as soon as we converge we diverge; for 
whereas Kant sees this 'rightness' as rooted in rationality, we see it as rooted in the nature 
of caring.  
 
11. Justice, Mercy, and the Golden Rule 
     It is significant to note that the 'eye for eye' rule of retributive justice is actually just 
the inverse of the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule says: Do to others as you would have 
others do to you. Retributive justice says: Have done to you as you would do to others. To 
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the extent that one lives by the Golden Rule one would invite, rather than fear, the 
application of retributive justice. To the extent that one fears the application of retributive 
justice one does so because one has violated the Golden Rule. 
     Properly considered, then, the Golden Rule and the rule of just retribution point to one 
another, and both point to the intrinsic value of caring beings. The rule of just retribution 
induces one to reflect upon the wrongness of violating another by having one consider 
one's own response to being violated in the same way. It wakes one up, thus, to the 
'wrong' of doing 'bad.' In this way, the rule of just retribution provides the Golden Rule 
with teeth. Having violated the other, one is now in no position to protest against being 
violated in turn. The rule of retribution warns: To refuse to respect others is to subject 
oneself, by one's own rule, to disrespect from others. The proportionality between crime 
and punishment is all important here, for retributive justice should make one see into the 
hurt one has oneself caused through one’s own immoral action.  
     But when proportionality is lost, as in the Augustinian doctrine of original sin and 
eternal punishment, the meaning of justice is lost as well. The Augustinian doctrine, taken 
literally, provides an eternal punishment for an 'original sin' that is a single act of 
disobedience on the part of our first parents. Not only doesn't the punishment fit the 
crime, but one is left entirely in the dark as to what the significance of the crime is, or 
who the victim of the crime is. Thus, one isn't even given the opportunity to sympathize 
with the victim, and thereby truly atone in one's heart, which is where the fear of 
retribution should lead. The meaning of justice is lost, and atonement is reduced to 
appeasement. 
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     Augustine's is an authoritarian ethic, quite at odds with the Golden Rule and the most 
sublime of Jesus' teachings. Augustine gives us God on the model of the Roman 
Emperor, far more concerned with the maintenance of order through intimidation than 
with the inculcation of goodness. In such an ethic, obedience is all important, for it 
secures the power of the Monarch, and right and wrong are identified with the pleasure 
and displeasure of whomever sits upon the throne. 
     What one finds in Jesus' actual teachings, however, is an attempt to convert the 
prevailing religious authoritarianism to an immanentism, through associating the God of 
the former with the values of the latter. Perhaps the most striking instance of this is the 
'sheep and goats' parable of Matthew 25. Here we have the Supreme Monarch in all his 
imperial glory and terror, separating out the 'loyal' from the 'disloyal,' but not on the basis 
of service to him, but on the basis of service to the weakest and most vulnerable in 
society: "For," says the great Monarch, "to the extent that you have done this for the least 
of these you have done it for me." In other words, the service customarily proffered the 
mighty is to be rendered to the needy, not simply because this is what the mighty 
command, but, much more significantly, because the needy embody the worthiness 
ordinarily attributed to the mighty: the Supreme Value is immanent in the neediest. Jesus 
is teaching that the reverence customarily granted the powerful ought rightly to be granted 
the vulnerable. Goodness lies in love of others, not in obeisance to power. 
     What Jesus is attempting, in other words, is a radical shift of religious paradigm, from 
a worship of power to a worship of goodness. But Augustine (and, as a result, much of 
Christianity after him) doesn't quite get it.  
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     Mercy as well must be seen in the light of the Golden Rule. Just as one would like to 
receive mercy from others when one has strayed, so one should be merciful. Jesus' 
statements concerning mercy, “Judge not lest you be judged” and “forgive and you will 
be forgiven,” may all be seen as specific applications of the moral logic of the Golden 
Rule. The reciprocity expressed in these formulas is not a matter of tit-for-tat, but a call to 
reflection on the harm done through judgmentalism and the good of reconciliation. 
     The rationale for mercy, i.e., amelioration of the punishment prescribed by strict 
retributive justice, is that although the transgressor has violated caring she has not, in fact, 
ceased to be a caring being whose good must continue to be considered. Thus, the moral 
judge must treat the transgressor with more regard than the transgressor has treated her 
victim. This provides the moral ground for such teachings as 'turn the other cheek' and 
'love thine enemy' and 'forgive unto seventy times seven times', etc. Even after the 
transgressor has transgressed, she remains a matter of moral concern.  
 
 
  35 
  
 
 
